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1) Introduction
Cooperation between political communities, which involves pooling and delegation of resources (cf.
Hooghe & Marks 2014), is ambiguous by nature. On the one hand, cooperating communities can
enhance their problem-solving and governance capacity and thereby achieve better policy outputs.
On the other hand, cooperation always comes along with a certain loss of self-determination and
autonomy which may hamper a community's control over the respective policy. After engaging in
cooperation,  a community is not the sole center of policy-making and governance anymore, but
shares its position with its collaborators (Bevir 2006, Hupe & Edwards 2012, Sassen 2008). Politics
become co-politics. Intergovernmental cooperation, in this sense, entails a certain trade-off between
autonomy of decision making and effectiveness of public goods provision (cf. Dahl & Tufte 1972 for
a similar argument with respect to the size of political entities).
Despite  this  concession,  horizontal  cooperation  between  political  communities  becomes
increasingly  common.  It  can  be  informal,  brief,  and  ad  hoc  in  nature,  like  the  exchange  of
information between participants during a forum or a meeting. Or, alternatively, cooperation can be
formal, lasting, and institutionalized, like in associations or through contractual agreements in which
the joining communities oblige themselves to pool their resources to achieve an agreed upon goal
(cf. Hulst & Van Montfort 2007, 10, Vatter 2014, 135).The phenomenon of horizontal cooperation
can be observed on all different hierarchical levels – between nation states, between member states
of federations,  and between municipalities  (Hooghe & Marks 2003, 234-235) – but  its  intensity
increases as one approaches the bottom of the hierarchy. 
The reasons for intergovernmental cooperation (IGC) are well documented and described.
For example, pooling of resources can make the delivery of policies more effective or cost-efficient.
Especially in times of austerity, cooperation might thus even become a necessity to provide some
policies  at  all  (Hulst  & Van Montfort  2007, Sørensen & Torfing 2014,  241).  Or  consider  more
ideological factors. Two or more communities might share similar, or even the same, values and
belief systems. Based on these common grounds, those communities might already agree on means
and instruments of their policies, and hence find it helpful to coordinate their behavior and pool their
resources (Bochsler 2009, Bhatti & Hansen 2011). 
These  established  approaches normally focus on the  explanation  of  the total  amount  of
cooperation  a  political  community  engages  in.  Yet,  they  do  not  differentiate  between  different
cooperation intensities of a community in different policy fields. That is, they under-specify why
communities are more cooperative in some policy fields than in others. Empirically, however, the
intensity of intergovernmental cooperation varies considerably across different policy fields. Swiss
cantons, for example, cooperate extensively in financial and tax matters but less so in social policy
(cf. Vatter 2014, 136). Similarly, the amount of interstate compacts in the US also varies across
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policy fields (cf. Bowman & Woods 2010, 350). How, then, can we explain these different intensities
in intergovernmental cooperation across policy fields?
We  argue  that  the  nature  of  the  aforementioned  trade-off  between  autonomy and
effectiveness varies across policy fields. While in one policy field autonomy might be of crucial
importance to a given political community, it might emphasize effectiveness more elsewhere. To pin
down these differences, we propose to distinguish policies according to three dimensions. The first
dimension refers to the importance of citizen participation. The second to the level and amount of
competences a given political community has in a certain policy field. And the third dimension takes
into  account  the  cost-benefit  ratio  and  changed  access  to  resources  that  would  result  from
cooperation. Further, we expect that these dimensions are also reflected in the public debate, in our
case in media reporting, on IGC. If the participatory dimension of a given policy is important for a
given community, this should translate into a higher salience and emphasis of participatory concepts
in media's reporting on that policy. Likewise, the more relevant the dimensions of competences and
resources become, the more they are discussed publicly as well.
The remainder of this paper has the following structure. The upcoming section two will
briefly discuss existing theories for explaining IGC. After that, we will present the three dimensions
for distinguishing policies in section three. Section four will then present the empirical design of our
study, in particular discussing media analysis as a viable approach to classify policies empirically. It
will also give information on our case, which is the cooperation of Swiss cantons in the form of
concordats.  Section  five  will  present  the  results  of  our  analysis.  Our  findings  include  that
participation, competences, and resources have different levels of salience for various policy fields.
For example, participation is highly salient in reports on cooperation regarding education, science &
culture. Lastly, section six will end this paper with concluding remarks.
2.) Actor-Centered  Explanations   for Intergovernmental Cooperation
There are many different theories that aim to explain IGC. In general, they belong to at least one of
the following four strands. First, there are  functionalist theories which see IGC as a reaction to a
public problem. When a political system – be it on the local, member state, or nation state level – has
difficulties to cope with a certain task, IGC might be among the possible solutions (Hulst & Van
Montfort 2007, 6-7). When political communities join forces in the production of a certain public
good,  they  can  benefit  from  economies  of  scale  –  be  it  in  terms  of  finances,  personnel,
administration, or expertise (Steiner 2002, 121-122, Kellermann 2008, 197-201). Thus, when there is
“the possibility of mutual economic gains, governments decide to start cooperation” (Lelieveldt &
Princen 2011, 34). At the same time, IGC always means a loss of autonomy. From a functionalist
perspective, one would therefore expect that political communities only resort to this option when
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the gains that  can be achieved exceed the costs,  i.e. autonomy losses. This means that  – ceteris
paribus – political communities facing strong (economic) pressures are more prone to cooperate
(Kropp 2010, 150).
A second strand is concerned with the impact of the internal political structure of a given
system on its interaction with other political systems. Its internal political structure and functioning
is seen as an explanation for its cooperation behavior. Bolleyer (2006) argues, for example, that
political communities with high internal power-sharing (e.g. in the form of an over-sized government
coalition)  are  also  more  prone  to  engage  in  external power  sharing  in  the  form  of  IGC.  The
underlying argument is that the loss of autonomy for each political fraction is smaller, since they are
already sharing power, and therefore the hurdle for cooperation is smaller as well (Bolleyer & Börzel
2010). Thus, as in functionalist theory, the loss of autonomy is an important variable here. Yet, in this
strand it comes into play at another level. Unlike functionalist theory, this   more strand of theory
does not assume that a political system is a uniform stand-alone actor, but that one has to take a
closer  look  at  the  different  political  actors  within  it.  Relative  autonomy  losses  are  hence  the
determining ones.
The third strand also acknowledges the social, political, and spatial context within which a
political system is embedded, and the opportunity structure that results from it. Studies starting out
from this approach assume that one does not only have to look at the political system itself but at the
relations this system has with others  (e.g Bhatti  & Hansen 2011). On the one hand, the spatial
context in which a political system “resides” is invoked as an explanation. For instance, the number
of immediate neighbors often depict the set of potential cooperation partners (Kwon & Feiock 2010,
878).  Furthermore,  the  broader  spatio-institutional  context  is  also  deemed  relevant.  Post  (2002)
shows  that  in  metropolitan  areas  with  a  high  density  of  local  governments,  inter-municipal
cooperation is more frequent than in metropolitan areas with a lower density of local governments.
This explanation has, again, a functional touch to it: When opportunities are scarce, cooperation will
not occur and vice versa. On the other hand, scholars in this strand emphasize the importance of
homogeneous  social  and  political  structures  for  IGC to  take  place.  For  example,  two  political
communities  relatively  equal  in  wealth  and/or  political  ideology are  expected  to  have  a  higher
probability to cooperate than two more heterogeneous ones (Bochsler 2009, Kwon & Feiock 2010).
The explanation for this is again linked to autonomy. If a potential cooperation partner has a similar
social  structure  and  political  leaning,  it  is  likely  to  have  similar  interests  as  well,  making
compromises more feasible. Cooperation among homogeneous communities allows them to benefit
from the virtues of cooperation without having to accept too many of its vices.
Fourth and finally, IGC can also be analyzed from a historical-institutionalist perspective.
Bluntly speaking, historical institutionalists assume that present choices of political actors are always
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constrained by past  choices (Hall  & Taylor 1996, 941).  For IGC, this  means,  for  example,  that
existing cooperative agreements impact later ones. This impact of previous collaborations on the
probability  of  later  ones  can  take  very  different  forms.  For  instance,  existing  cooperative
relationships can enhance trust between the cooperating partners and facilitate further cooperation in
other  areas  (Steiner  2003,  567).  Furthermore,  cooperation  in  one  area  at  time  t-1 can  make
cooperation in another area at time t more likely or even desirable, even if this was not the goal or
even under consideration  earlier. Pierson (1996), in his seminal work on “The Path to European
Integration”, shows how cooperation in one policy field has changed actors'  power-relations and
positions, and facilitated further cooperation, even if this was not the initially intended goal. Thus,
this strand highlights the importance of taking the temporal dimension as well as the institutional
context  into account when analyzing IGC. With respect  to  the trade-off  between autonomy and
effectiveness,  historical  institutionalists  show that cooperation  happens  even  if  autonomy losses
might exceed effectiveness gains through cooperation (Pierson 1996). While this seems to contradict
the idea of a trade-off between autonomy and effectiveness at first, one can argue that the costs of
not integrating further exceed the autonomy losses not because of the gains that can be achieved via
cooperation  in  a  new  field,  but because  non-cooperation  might  endanger  existing  cooperative
institutions.
These four different approaches that have been applied to the analysis of IGC have two
things  in  common.  First,  they  all  compare  similar  political  communities  with  respect  to  their
cooperation behavior in toto or with respect to one specific policy. Normally, they are interested in
the overall extent of cooperation a given community has across different policy fields. Therefore,
these approaches look for explanations at the level of the community. Second, functional, structural,
and relational explanations all imply that a certain trade-off may exist between autonomy and self-
determination on the one hand and the benefits of IGC on the other. Hence, in cooperation autonomy
is “exchanged” against  effectiveness, such as money is exchanged for goods and services. Even
further, historical institutionalists would argue that communities are actually limited in their choices
regarding this trade-off, given that previous events constrain decisions made now (cf. also Vester
2009).  In the following, we will propose an addition to these actor-centered perspectives. We will
shift the analytical focus from whole political communities to parts of it, namely to policies, and
present three dimensions which we believe are important for explaining the amount of cooperation in
a certain area. Assigning a position on these three different dimensions further allows to make a
statement about a policy’s position with respect to the autonomy-effectiveness trade-off.
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3.) A Policy-Centered Explanation for Intergovernmental Cooperation – The 'PCR' Scheme
Our  policy-centered  approach  complements the  actor-centered  approaches  and  argues  that
differences in patterns of cooperation can be attributed to systematic differences between policies.
This allows for a more fine-grained analysis of cooperation. In particular, it helps to explain why
communities often and intensively cooperate in some policies, but are more reluctant to do so in
others.
We propose to distinguish policies in accordance with the “PCR” scheme (an abbreviation
of its three components): i.) the importance of participation for a given community and its members
in determining the outcome of a certain policy;  ii.)  the  competences and capacity of a political
community in a certain policy field, referring to the degree of responsibility and control a given
community has over it; iii.) the resources that are available in a certain policy field. This component
looks at the cost-benefit ratio that comes along with cooperation. In the remainder of this section, we
will introduce each component in more detail,  arguing that they allow us to distinguish between
those policies in which cooperation becomes more likely, and those in which it is less likely. In the
end, we will propose a simple typology to classify policies into two ideal types, namely into core
policies, in which cooperation is the least likely, and periphery policies, where it is the most.
First,  policies can differ in the extent to which they attract public attention and citizen’s
desire for  participation. Some policies can be highly salient issues and constitutive of a political
community’s self-perception, while other policies rarely manage to gain public awareness and are
highly instrumental in that they ”only” manage a certain issue (cf. Hooghe & Marks 2008, 2, Leca
1996).  Thus,  some  policies  are  important  for  political  communities  as  centers  of  deliberation,
community-building,  and political  expression (cf.  Manin et  al.  1987).  They are  the locus where
citizens express their  will  for  self-determination and provide input to the political  system. Such
policies  are  also  symbols  and  represent  joint  efforts  of  a  community,  and,  consequently,  of  its
collective identity. In this regard, policies produce communities (cf. also Keating & Wilson 2014,
840-841).  Other  policies  only  have  a  marginally  developed  expressive  function  for  a  political
community. There is no disagreement about how things should be done, it is only important that they
are done, which also could imply a public disinterest in a policy such as water provision and waste
disposal.  These  policies  have  a  merely  instrumental  function  for  political  communities.  On  the
participation dimension,  policies  can  vary  according  to  the  extent  to  which  the  members  of  a
political community – i.e. citizens – deem it important to participate in elaborating solutions to a
certain  problem or  to  voice  their  opinion  on  a  certain  matter.  We  would  expect  that  the  more
important this expressive function in a given policy field is, the more difficult it is for a political
community to cooperate in that field. This is because cooperation entails pooling and delegation,
hence it implies a reduction of possibilities for citizens to participate.
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Second,  policies  can also be distinguished  in  accordance  to  the scope  of  influence  and
control or the  competences and capacity a given community has in a given field. Hupe and Hill
(2009) and Hupe and Edwards (2012) distinguish three different dimensions of governance. The first
is the constitutive dimension, where institutions are created and established. Here, the focus lies on
structure. The second dimension is the  directional one, it  is concerned with content. Finally, the
operational one is the third dimension, and it focuses on process and “getting things done”. Note the
hierarchy that is created across the three dimensions. On the constitutive level, the degree of control
and influence, but also responsibility, is the highest. It is lower for the directional scope, and the
lowest for the operational one. If we link this to our analytical framework, this means that political
communities can have different competences and capacity in different policy fields. They might have
constitutive competences and capacity – and thus a very high degree of self-determination – in one
policy field, whereas they only have directional competences and capacity in another one. We argue
that  political  communities  are  more reluctant to cooperate  with other  political  communities in a
given policy field, if their competence and capacity is of a higher level in the respective domain.
This assumption is again linked to the trade-off between autonomy and effectiveness. The amount of
autonomy that is lost is higher in policy fields where governance capacity is high than in policy
fields where it is rather low.
A third and final distinction refers to the  resources  a political community has in a policy
field and what that community expects to happen with these resources after cooperation has begun.
That is, the perceived outcomes and consequences of IGC. First, the community in question might
expect changes in the distribution of costs and benefits (Wilson 1974), i.e. economic consequences.
For example, cooperation might lead to a wider distribution of costs,  and a more evenly shared
burden, and thus to an increase in community resources in the respective area. In particular in urban
settings, cities in metropolitan areas often bear the costs for services that are not only used by their
residents but also by residents from surrounding municipalities (Kübler 2006, Dreier et al. 2014).
Thus, for a city at the center of a metropolitan area, it might be beneficial in terms of economic
resources  to  cooperate  in  some  policy  areas,  such  as  health  care,  infrastructure,  or  cultural
institutions to distribute the burden of providing these services more evenly. Secondly, the political
consequences are also of relevance. In particular, one can argue that cooperation will either increase
or  decrease the leeway of communities. An increase means that the range and leverage of options
and choices for the community is enlarged; in this respect, cooperation can be enabling. On the other
hand,  cooperation  might  also  lower  range  and  leverage,  and  hence  it  might  have  constraining
consequences. For example, cooperation can be used “instrumentally” to gain control over issues
that otherwise would have been out of reach for the involved partners (cf. Klijn & Skelcher 2008,
Skelcher 2010). Thus, by cooperation, political communities might increase their political resources
7
in  the  given  area.  Further,  existing  cooperation  schemes  can  increase  the  political  costs  of  not
cooperating – i.e. to not offend partners and endanger well-functioning existing collaborations – and
thus make cooperation more likely. In short, communities can (and will) anticipate and evaluate the
consequences  from cooperation  schemes,  and  may express  their  preference  or  dislike  for  them
accordingly. Policies can therefore be distinguished according to the expected gains in political and
economic resources that result from cooperation.
These arguments encourage enriching and complementing the actor-centered perspective
with  a  policy-centered  one,  and  hence  allow  qualifying  the  trade-off  between  autonomy  and
effectiveness resulting from cooperation of political communities. A loss of autonomy is especially
relevant if the expressive function of a given policy is dominating, since it hinders the possibility of
citizens to participate. On the other hand, if the focus lies more on the delivery of policy outputs, the
trade-off between autonomy and cooperation might not be perceived as salient (cf. Scharpf 1970,
1990). In addition, especially constitutive competences and capacities are pertinent for the trade-off.
Here, the most fundamental assumptions and prescriptions are made and inscribed into policies (cf.
Ingram & Schneider 1990, 1997, Schneider & Ingram 1997). The argument is that more autonomy is
lost  if  communities  cooperate  in  areas  where  their  competences  and  capacity  are  constitutive,
compared  with  cooperation  in  policy  areas  where  they  only  have  directional  or  operational
competences and capacities. And finally, the expected outcomes of cooperation play an important
role as well. Especially if the regime of cooperation in a policy area is distributing costs unevenly, or
if it is substantially constraining the choices of the involved partners, i.e. diminishing their resources,
it becomes less attractive.
Although these three policy dimensions may vary independently of  each other,  they do
converge in two extreme points (see Figure 1). We have called the first one “core” policies, because
policies near this point of convergence lie at the very heart of the identity, self-perception, and self-
determination  of  political  communities.  In  these  core  policies,  autonomy is  very important  and
cooperation  is  thus  very  unlikely.  The  trade-off  between  autonomy and  effectiveness  gains  by
cooperation is so loop-sided that communities will try to avoid cooperation as best as they can. On
the other hand, the three dimensions converge in a second extreme point, which is called “periphery”
policies.  Regarding  those  policies,  cooperation  does  not  threaten  identity  and  self-perception  of
communities as strongly, and hence it is more likely. Furthermore, the gains that can be achieved via
cooperation  are  perceived  to  be  very  high.  Thus  here,  the  trade-off  is  loop-sided  towards
effectiveness and cooperation is very likely. 
Figure 1 about here
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4. Research Design
Empirical  researchers  classifying  policies  into  different  types  usually  follow  one  out  of  two
approaches (Smith 2002). The first one relies on “objective” indicators, such as administrative data
(the budget in a certain domain), structural characteristics (the number of citizens using a certain
service), or legal documents (who is responsible for what). However, there is a vast universe of
potentially suitable indicators and the result of the classification highly depends on the indicators
chosen.  To  avoid  arbitrariness,  this  choice  must  be  well  justified.  The  second  approach  to  the
classification  of  policies  relies  on  perceptions.  Smith  (2002),  for  example,  uses  a  taxonomic
approach  to  policy  classification.  In  particular,  he  proposes  to  analyze  the  perceptions  that
individuals have about policies. He then tests whether the indicators derived from a recent policy
typology cluster in such a way as to reproduce the patterns of individuals' perceptions.
The present paper follows the second approach; we analyze the perceptions of “the public”
on IGC between cantons  in  Swiss  media.  This  was  done  for  several  reasons.  First,  one of  our
dimensions,  participation, is difficult to measure via an analysis of legal documents, institutional
settings, or structural indicators, because this approach would miss the dynamical evolution of this
dimension. An issue may become highly salient and controversial in a relatively short period of time,
and the public’s desire for participation and expression raises with it.  Another dimension in our
scheme, resources, tries to capture the expected outcome of IGC in a given domain. This dimension
is perception-based by nature, since it is about an ex ante evaluation of the cost-benefit ratio – both
in economic and in political terms – of IGC. Second, contemporary political processes are always
mediated, meaning that the different actors participating in the process do not only interact directly,
but also indirectly through the news media (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999, 248). Adding to this, these
processes are also  framed in a certain way, i.e. one or several interpretations of a process and its
consequences are  offered (be it  by the media,  or  by public  officials)  that  correspond in varying
degrees to the “hard” facts on the issue at stake (cf. Esser 2013, 155-157). Therefore, it may be less
important  to  look at  the actual legal  foundations in  a certain domain, e.g.  the competences and
capacity of a political community in a given area, than to investigate how these legal foundations are
perceived, because there is the potential for deviation between the two. For example, citizens might
overestimate a political  entity’s  competences and capacity in  a given domain and thus be more
reluctant regarding cooperation, while politicians might underestimate their political resources in
another.
Media content analysis is usually not understood as analysis of perceptions. However, media
content  –  like  individual  perceptions  –  can  be  seen  as  a  certain  construction  of  social  reality
(Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999, 250) and should in any case not be treated as a source of “objective”
information about an issue. The way this “construction” comes about depends upon a complex set of
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factors. For instance, journalists give more attention to some events than to others and thereby set the
agenda for public debates (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007, 10-11). Furthermore, they do not report on
issues in a neutral way but by framing it – by highlighting some and leaving out other aspects of a
topic (ibid.). This means that media coverage always transports a certain idea and interpretation of an
issue. Hence, citizens and political actors views about, and interpretations of, political processes are
also shaped by the way media report on them (e.g. Brewer & Gross 2005, Maier 2011).
4.1 Case Selection and Data
To analyze our scheme empirically, we investigate IGC between Swiss cantons. Switzerland has a
federal structure with three hierarchical levels. From lowest to highest, these are the municipalities,
which  are  embedded  in  the  cantons,  which  in  turn  are  embedded  in  the  federal  superstructure.
Although this hierarchy exists, it is the cantons that hold most of the competences (legally), while
the  municipalities  and  the  federal  level  are  only responsible  for  those  issues  that  are  explicitly
handed over to them (Fleiner 2002, 99). Further, cantons are subjects to international law and able to
engage in contractual agreements with each other. Thus, when it comes to issues for which they have
competences, cantons may choose whether to engage in cooperation and may decide the conditions
of this cooperation on their own (Vatter 2014, 120-122). Empirically, cantons do engage in IGC
frequently, in particular in the form of concordats, i.e. contractual agreements. Bochsler and Sciarini
(2006, 29) counted a total of 760 valid concordats in 2005 between cantons.
For our purposes, concordats are an interesting case to study for three reasons. First, given
the rather large degree of competences that cantons have, concordats can be found in large numbers
on a large number of issues. This provides a high degree of variation between different concordats in
terms of contractual parties involved, policy field, as well as width of the concordat (how many
partners are involved?) and its depth (how intense is the resulting cooperation?). Second, the strong
direct-democratic instruments of Switzerland involve citizens in many political procedures. As a
result, politics, even of local issues, is discussed frequently and intensively among the public, and
media report often on concordats. In this respect, we can analyze how the media frames concordats
and how it interprets them (cf. Esser 2013, 155-157, Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999, 250). Thirdly, given
the aforementioned points, we expect that the variation between different concordats is reflected in
the reporting on them as well. In other words, we expect that reporting on concordats from a given
policy field will systematically put more emphasis on, for example, the participatory dimension and
less on others. For concordats from other policy fields, the media will focus more on capacity and
competences, or resources.
To investigate media coverage on concordats between Swiss cantons, we analyze newspaper
articles from one of the largest Swiss newspapers over the last ten years. Given that Switzerland has
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four different official languages, the media landscape is somewhat divided along linguistic barriers
(Marcinkowski 2006, 399). Swiss-German is the most common language, however, officially used in
21 out of 26 cantons. We hence focus our analysis on this part of Switzerland, well aware that this
somewhat limits the generalizability of our results. In particular, we have included the Zurich-based
“Tages-Anzeiger” in our analysis, which is one of the most widely-read newspapers in Switzerland1.
Access to the articles of this newspaper was provided by LexisNexis.
We have searched for  articles  that  include (in  German,  including  variants)  “concordat”,
“inter-cantonal cooperation”, “inter-cantonal agreement”, and “inter-cantonal contract”. Articles that
referred to religious concordats (i.e. contracts with the Holy See) have been excluded. For a search
interval of ten years (2005-01-01 to 2014-12-31) this resulted in a database of 459 articles.2
4.2) Methods
We relied on dictionary coding for our empirical analysis. In this method, the researcher creates a set
of key-words for each concept she is interested in. These key-words are then counted to determine
how often they appear in the text corpus, i.e., within each unit of text that is part of the analysis.
Usually, this raw count is transformed into a relational scale, e.g. a proportion, to be used further in
the analysis (Garry & Laver 2000, Lowe et al.  2011). Hence, dictionary coding is a quantitative
content analysis (Neuendorff 2002) during which the researcher generates numerical data from her
text corpus. This approach allows to measure the salience of the concepts she is interested in, and is
based on the assumption that the more often a given text mentions the key-words that belong to each
of these concepts, the more important or relevant this concept is.
Dictionary coding can be employed with the help of computers and is a rather cheap, fast,
and reliable technique for content analysis. Its validity, however, depends on the text corpus chosen
and the dictionaries used, but also on the interpretation of the results. Having presented the text
corpus above, we will address the remaining two points below.
4.3) The Dictionary – Operationalization of Policy Fields and PRC
To determine how much emphasis is put on each of our three dimensions in public debate on a
certain policy area, one needs to distinguish between different policy fields in the text corpus. To do
so, we have used the topical typology of concordats proposed by Bochsler and Sciarini (2006). They
distinguish six different policy fields or concordat areas for the Swiss case based on an extensive
1 On its website, the  Tages-Anzeiger self-declares to have 466'000 subscribers, which would equal to
about 13.2% of all Swiss households.
2 For  pre-processing  the  articles,  Python scripts  have  been  used  (available  upon request).  Note  that
dictionary coding does neither require stemming or stop-word removal, nor the removal of numbers or
punctuation marks.
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analysis  of  all  Swiss concordats  from 1848 to 2005. In figure 2 below, the areas are  displayed
together with the total number of concordats in each of the fields since the foundation of the Swiss
state  in 1848. We have adopted this  typology and hence distinguish between those six different
policy fields. Further, articles in the  Tages-Anzeiger usually clearly identify concordats by names.
For example, the concordat on the “harmonization of mandatory education” is referred to by the
literal “harmos”, and it belongs in category 1, i.e. “education, science & culture”. Based on these
names, we constructed a first dictionary to determine to which of Bochsler and Sciarini's (2006)
categories each text of the corpus belongs. This raw count of the categories has been re-coded as a
percentage score, to indicate how much of its content a given article uses to indicate them.
Figure 2 about here
To determine how much emphasis each text is putting on participation, competences & capacity, and
resources, we have constructed a dictionary for each of the three concepts (available upon request).
Since  we  used  Will  Lowe's  software  Yoshikoder to  apply  the  dictionaries,  they  follow  the
specifications of this program. Although, due to limitations in space, we cannot discuss the three
dictionaries in detail, we still give a brief introduction to their core features. The example key-words
given below have been translated from German into English for the purpose of this paper. Hence,
they depict the concepts on which the German dictionary is based. However, they are not a direct
and literal translation of the German key-words, and in particular omit truncation, stemming, and the
use of wild-cards.
Participation: The  participation  dimension  of  our  scheme  indicates  how important  it  is  for  the
community to express itself through politics. Hence, this dictionary includes key-words to identify
specific actors within communities such as “citizens”, “parties”, or “the people”. Further, it  also
includes political instruments such as “vote”, “referendum” or “ballot”. Another group of key-words
refers to specific outcomes of participation, like “accept”, “refuse”, or “discordant”. Finally, we have
also included more abstract terms such as “democracy”, “conflict”, and “transparency”.
Competences  &  Capacity: This  dimension  indicates  which  actor  on  which  federal  level  is
responsible for a given policy, and whether this responsibility is more constitutive, directional, or
operational.  In  the dictionary,  we hence  have included  several  public  actors  that  can hold such
responsibilities.  This  includes  for  example  “(federal  /  cantonal  /  municipal)  administration”  and
“department”, but also “(federal / cantonal / district) courts” or “committees”. We have also included
several policy-related key-words like “regulation” or “ordinance”. Finally, there are more general
terms like “harmonize”, “competence”, “responsibility”, or “constitution”.
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Resources: This dimension indicates both resources of communities and access to them. Thus in this
dictionary,  there are key-words like “[Swiss] franks”, “CHF”, or “budget”.  There are also terms
indicating “money”, “costs”, “efficiency”, and similar more general concepts. Finally, we have also
included  key-words  referring  more  to  the  dynamical  nature  of  resources,  such  as  “increase”,
“improve”, or “restrict”.
4.4) Analysis and Regression
The raw counts of dictionary coding should not be interpreted directly,  but translated into more
meaningful scales (Lowe et al. 2011). In our case, we are interested in interpreting participation,
competences & capacity, and resources and their respective salience with respect to different policy
areas.  This  means that  a measure is needed for  each of  these concepts to  determine its  relative
significance in a given article. This paper employs two different measures to capture the salience of
the different concepts. First, percentage scores determine the relative importance of a certain concept
within a given article, and were obtained by dividing the raw count of the concept by the total word
count of that article. This resulted in a fraction indicating the “importance” of a certain concept. For
example, a given text might have a value of '.05' in participation, meaning that this text devotes 5%
of its content to key-words from the participation dictionary. Table 1 (below in section 5) gives an
overview  of  the  different  concepts  transformed  in  this  way.  Table  A.1  in  the  appendix  shows
descriptive statistics for the raw word counts of the different concepts. We call this first measurement
the individual salience of concepts.
The second measure of salience compares the individual salience of a given concept with
the salience of another one. It  was calculated with the following formula (Laver & Garry 2000,
Lowe et al. 2011):
Raw Count Dimension1 − Raw CountDimension 2
Raw Count Dimension1 + Raw Count Dimension 2  (Eq. 1)
This resulted in a scale that is bound between -1 and +1, where positive values mean that dimension
1 (e.g. participation) is more salient in a given article than dimension 2 (e.g. competences), while
negative  values  mean  dimension  2  is  more  important  than  dimension  1.  Consequently,  a  zero
indicates that both dimensions are equally salient. Because this measurement indicates how much
more salient a dimension is depending on the salience of another dimension, it is called conditional
salience.
To examine whether there are systematic patterns between the policy field of concordats and
the public debate on them regarding participation, competences & capacity, and resources, we have
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conducted  regression  analyses  using  the  policy  field  scores  as  independent  variables.  Both  the
individual and conditional salience were used as dependent variables in two different estimations. In
particular, the former is bound between 0% and 100%. In general, OLS regressions are not suited to
explain percentage distributions. This is because, firstly, OLS regressions assume unbound values.
Second, if the values of the dependent variable are skewed to the extreme points, error terms are not
distributed  normally,  leading  to  heteroskedasticity  (Papke  &  Wooldridge  1996,  Paolino  2001).
However,  beta  regression can  handle  percentage  scores,  because  it  assumes  that  the  dependent
variable is beta-distributed (Paolino 2001, Buckley 2003, Ferrari & Cribari-Neto 2004, Smithson &
Verkuilen 2006, Espinheira et al. 2008). In general, beta-distributed values are bound between zero
and one, with the notable exclusion of the boundaries of zero and one themselves. The distribution is
flexible to depict skewed, symmetrical, uni- or multimodal shapes. Estimation was done with STATA
and with the  betafit and  dbetafit command3. For the second part of our analysis, i.e. the
conditional  salience,  three  separate  estimations  were  calculated,  because  we  compare  each
participation, competences & capacity, and resources to one another. The dependent variables of this
second part are bound between -1 and 1, which makes them difficult to estimate through regression
techniques. For the present work in progress, we report the results of an OLS regression with the full
awareness of the short-comings stemming from this endeavor.
5.) Results
A look at Table 1 below gives a first impression on the salience of the PCR dimensions and the
different policy fields in media coverage on Swiss concordats. Several things are worth mentioning.
First, one can see that the absolute salience of participation, competences & capacity, and resources
varies.  While  competences  &  capacity  is  most  frequently  referred  to,  closely  followed  by
participation, key-words pertaining to the resources dimension are only appearing half as much in
our text corpus compared to the other two dimensions.
Table 1 about here
This difference might be explained by the nature of the dimensions with respect to cooperation. Both
the participatory opportunities as well  as competences & capacity of a given political entity are
likely to  be restricted in the course of entering a concordat,  while a political community might
indeed benefit resource-wise. The reason that participation and competences & capacity are referred
to more often might lie in the tendency of the media to have a certain “negativity bias”, i.e. to cover
negative things more often than positive ones or to criticize more than to praise  (cf. Bell 1991).
3 Written by Maarten L. Buis, Nicholas J. Cox, & Stephen P. Jenkins.
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Because a concordat might entail a certain drawback for participation and competences & capacity,
these two dimensions are covered more often in media reports. Yet in direct comparison between the
two, i.e. their conditional salience score, competences & capacity is more salient on average than
participation, making the competences & capacity dimension the most important one of the three.
Yet, participation is the dimension with the highest salience in a single newspaper article.
When turning to the six policy fields for concordats we identified based on Bochsler and
Sciarini (2006), the following statements can be made. Concordats in the fields of education, science
& culture, and state structure & security are covered much more than concordats in more “technical”
fields  such  as  infrastructure,  economy,  and  public  finances.  Health  &  social  security  takes  an
intermediate position. The dominance of education, science & culture and state structure & security
can at least partly be attributed to two concordats in the respective fields that received a lot of public
attention in  recent years.  In  education,  the so-called “Harmos”-concordat  aims to harmonize the
different  cantonal  school  systems  in  Switzerland.  In  the  domain  of  security,  the  “Hooligan”-
concordat aims to establish nation-wide rules and a database to capture hooligans in order to combat
the violence in relation to soccer matches. Both of these issues are rather controversial in terms of
competences and capacity (Harmos), and violation of fundamental rights (hooligans) in the Swiss
public.
This short look at the descriptive picture shows that there is both variance in the salience of
different policy fields as well as in the salience of PCR in media reports on concordats. To assess
whether there is systematic variation, the results from the beta regression on the individual salience
are reported in Table 2.
Table 2 about here
The most salient policy fields in media coverage on Swiss concordats are also the ones that are most
strongly correlated with the dimension of participation. When an article is about either education,
science & culture, or about state structure & security, discourses on participation are more likely to
be found in  that  article.  The  other  policy fields  do not display significant  correlations with the
participation  dimension,  which  means that  participation  is  strongly debated  in  policy fields  that
affect citizens directly. The second dimension of the framework, competences & capacity, is most
salient in articles on state structure & security as well as in articles on public finances & taxes.
Hence, concordats regarding the very structure of the state, or its financing, evoke strong public
responses.  Key-words pertaining to  the third dimension,  resources,  are  most  often mentioned in
reports on health & social security as well as in reports on public finances & taxes.
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Table 3 about here
Table 3 gives an account of the substantive relationships between policy field and the individual
salience of the PCR dimensions. One can see that the relationships between some policy fields and
some dimensions are quite substantive. For example, when the number of key-words in an article
referring to the policy field of state structure & security changes from its minimum to its maximum,
this is associated with an 6.54 percentage point increase in the share of key-words devoted to the
dimension of participation. Keeping in mind that the maximum possible change in this dimension
amounts to 10.2 percentage points, this can be considered a quite substantive influence. The same
holds true for the relationship between the policy field of public finances & taxes and the resources
dimension. The maximum change in the number of key-words of this policy field is associated with
a  3.38  percentage  points  increase  in  individual  salience  of  the  resources  dimension,  given  a
maximum variance of 4.6 percentage points here. 
These results support the idea that the importance of the three different dimensions of a
policy  varies  across  different  policy  fields.  In  public  debates  on  IGC  in  Switzerland,  some
policyfields seem to be more strongly connoted with a discourse on participation, while others depict
a  stronger  link  with a  discourse  on resources.  Finally,  there  are  other  policy-fields that  are  not
associated  with  the  salience  of  PCR  in  public  debates,  such  as  infrastructure,  transport  &
environment.
Analyzing the conditional salience of the three dimensions across policy fields confirms this
picture. In Table 4 one can see the results for OLS regressions on the conditional salience of the PCR
dimensions. Recall that positive values mean that the first dimension is more salient compared to the
second one and the other way round (see section 4.4 above).
Table 4 about here
From these models we can derive that the dimension of participation is especially important in media
coverage on the policy-field of education, science & culture compared to the other two dimensions.
Further, in media reports in the domain of health & social security, discourses on resources are much
more frequent than discourses on participation and on competences & capacity, respectively. What is
interesting is that in articles on state structure & security,  the dimension of participation and of
competences  &  capacity  seem  to  be  equally  important.  However,  compared  to  discourses  on
resources,  debates on competences & capacity seem to be more frequent in  media coverage on
concordats  in  that  policy  field.  For  the  remaining  three  policy  fields,  there  are  no  statistically
significant effects that would allow to infer a different importance of the three dimensions compared
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to each other. However, it is still worth mentioning that for all three policy fields, the signs of the
coefficients are pointing away from discourses on participation. In articles that deal with one of these
three policy fields, participation seems to be slightly less important than the other two dimensions.
All in all, also the analysis of the conditional salience of the three different dimensions tends to
support our idea of a different importance of PCR across policy fields, although the three dimensions
seem to play an overall more important role in some policy fields than in others.
6.) Conclusion
Cooperation  between  political  communities  often  involves  a  trade-off  between  a  community’s
political autonomy and the effectiveness with which it can provide policies and services. We have
argued that this trade-off varies for different policies. In this paper, we have proposed to analyze
three different  dimensions of a given policy,  namely participation,  competences & capacity,  and
resources (PCR). For a first test of the empirical relevance of our framework, we analyzed media
coverage on IGC in Switzerland over the last ten years. We indeed found evidence that the salience
of the three proposed dimensions varies with respect to different policy fields. While, for example,
participation  seems  to  be  an  important  issue  in  intergovernmental  arrangements  on  education,
science & culture, resources are a more salient issue in health & social security.
Evidently, our study has several limitations. First, we do not investigate actual levels of IGC
in a certain policy field but only the frequency with which concordats are referred to in the media.
Still, the distinction between participation, competences & capacity, and resources is meaningful and
clearly reflected in  the media.  Second, the dictionary coding so far  only allows to  measure the
presence of  a  given concept,  but  is  insensible  to  other  characteristics  of  the  public  debate.  For
example, participation might be discussed within an article in different ways, such as pointing out an
abundance or  lack  of it.  Yet,  to  identify  a  concordat  –  or  any  other  IGC for  that  matter  –  as
resembling a core or periphery policy, and with it estimate the likelihood of cooperation, this more
fine-grained  information  is  needed.  Third,  we  only  analyze  media  coverage  of  one  newspaper.
Coverage in other newspaper might be different and hence our analysis might not give an accurate
picture of public discourse on IGC in Switzerland.
Future research should investigate the historical development of “critical” concordats, like
“Harmos”  or  the  Hooligan-concordat  to  gain  further  insights  on  the  relevance  and  role  of
participation,  competences  &  capacity,  and  resources  regarding  inter-cantonal  cooperation  in
Switzerland. Further, an application of the framework to cooperation in other federal systems might
reveal that the relative importance of the three dimensions is dependent on the context. For example,
Switzerland has a long lasting tradition of direct-democratic involvement of its citizens. Hence, the
public media might emphasize in particular issues of participation  more than it does so in other
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countries.  Or  consider  the  question  of  competences  and  capacity,  in  particular  in  relation  to
international  or  supra-national  organizations.  A  loss  of  competences  resulting  from  outward
cooperation, i.e. with a partner outside of the given country, might be perceived more gravely than
the  loss  of  competences  caused  by  inward cooperation.  Lastly,  discussion  on  resources  always
include assumptions, made explicit or not, on the legitimacy of acquiring and spending them (cf.
Burns  2005,  Wilson  1974).  Although  IGC  might  actually  reduce  the  resources  of  a  political
community, the public media might frame this as legitimate and – in fact – desirable.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Policy-Centered Explanation of IGC – The PCR-scheme
Note:  Systematic  overview of  three  explanations  of  IGC in  federal  systems,  including  two points  of  convergence,  in  which
cooperation is expected to be most likely (periphery policies) and least likely (core policies), respectively.
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Figure 2: Number of Concordats per Policy Field
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Note: Own calculations based on dataset from Bochsler/Sciarini (2006)
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean P50 Min Max Std. Dev.
PCR DIMENSIONS
Participation .011 .008 0 .102 .013
Competences & 
Capacity .014 .011 0 .072 .012
Resources .006 .004 0 .046 .008
Participation vs. 
Competences -.189 -.155 -1 1 .558
Participation vs. 
Resources .187 .241 -1 1 .683
Competences vs. 
Resources .373 .444 -1 1 .570
POLICY FIELDS
Education, Science & 
Culture .007 0 0 .075 .011
Health & Social Security .003 0 0 .056 .009
State Structure & 
Security .006 0 0 .118 .013
Infrastructure, Transport
& Environment .001 0 0 .056 .006
Economy & Agriculture .001 0 0 .085 .007
Public Finances & 
Taxes .001 0 0 .040 .003
Note: Articles are the units of analysis, N=459
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Table 2: Absolute Salience of PCR
Participation Competences &Capacity Resources
Education, Science & Culture 18.60***(3.02)
5.11
(3.31)
6.90
(4.15)
Health & Social Security -9.86(6.83)
5.49
(3.61)
9.60*
(4.02)
State Structure & Security 16.30***(2.08)
12.25***
(2.23)
-12.78
(6.84)
Infrastructure, Transport & 
Environment
-5.92
(7.57)
-.36
(5.42)
-2.25
(7.84)
Economy & Agriculture -7.88(12.34)
3.37
(4.62)
.94
(6.57)
Public Finances & Taxes 16.23(12.78)
28.07***
(7.94)
39.10***
(7.17)
Constant -4.52***(.06)
-4.33***
(.05)
-4.72***
(.07)
AIC -2508.29 -2815.81 -2300.79
AIC (Null-Model) -2458.33 -2800.83 -2281.47
BIC -2476.89 -2783.38 -2270.95
BIC (Null-Model) -2450.48 -2792.72 -2274.01
Wald Chi2 (6) 90.15***g 39.79*** 45.70***
N 374 426 308
Note:  Articles  are  units  of  analysis;  Estimation  was  done  with  beta-regression  in  STATA.  Numbers  of
observations vary due to zeros in dependent variables, which are excluded from beta-regression. Significance
levels indicated as: *** for p<=0.001; ** for p<=0.01; * for p<=0.05.
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Table 3: Discrete Changes for Beta-Regressions
Participation Competences &Capacity Resources
Min 
Max +/- ½ SD
Min 
Max +/- ½ SD
Min 
Max +/- ½ SD
Education, Science 
& Culture
3.43
(1.00)
.28
(.05)
.5
(.38)
.08
(.05)
.45
(.33)
.07
(.04)
Health & Social 
Security
-.58
(.30)
-.08
(.05)
.53
(.4)
.07
(.04)
.64
(.35)
.09
(.04)
State Structure & 
Security
6.54
(1.76)
.28
(.04)
4.24
(1.4)
.21
(.04)
-.37
(.16)
-.08
(.04)
Infrastructure, 
Transport & 
Environment
-.38
(.41)
-.04
(.05)
.03
(.44)
.00
(.05)
-.1
(.33)
-.01
(.04)
Economy & 
Agriculture
-.49
(.61)
-.04
(.06)
.48
(.76)
.03
(.05)
-.06
(.49)
.00
(.03)
Public Finances & 
Taxes
1.21
(1.28)
-.06
(.05)
2.97
(1.37)
.11
(.03)
3.38
(1.19)
.10
(.02)
Note: Calculations are done with debtafit in Stata; Coefficients are percentage point changes, standard errors in 
parentheses; Bold=significant coefficients; All variables held constant at their means; E(participation|x)=1.35; 
E(competences & capacity|x)=1.5; E(resources|x)=.94
Table 4: Conditional Salience of PCR
Participation vs.
Competences
Participation vs.
Resources
Competences vs.
Resources
Education, Science & Culture 11.31***(2.45)
10.36***
(2.97)
-.73
(2.61)
Health & Social Security -14.16***(2.85)
-17.48***
(3.46)
-4.73
(3.04)
State Structure & Security 1.55(2.13)
12.84***
(2.58)
9.85***
(2.26)
Infrastructure, Transport & 
Environment
-6.58
(4.52)
-.26
(5.48)
3.05
(4.82)
Economy & Agriculture -7.24(3.63)
-5.99
(4.39)
-.82
(3.86)
Public Finances & Taxes -6.22(9.27)
-15.21
(11.22)
-11.01
(9.87)
Constant -.21***(.04)
.10*
(.05)
.33***
(.04)
Adj. R2 .13 .15 .05
F (6, 452) 12.15 14.31 5.28
N 459 459 459
Note:  Articles  are  units  of  analysis;  Estimation  was  done with  OLS regression  in  STATA.  Significance levels
indicated as: *** for p<=0.001; ** for p<=0.01; * for p<=0.05.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics Raw Counts
Mean P50 Min Max Std. Dev.
Participation 4.55 3 0 31 5.01
Competences & Capacity 5.91 4 0 36 5.27
Resources 3.56 2 0 42 5.12
Education, Science & 
Culture 3.05 0 0 40 5.52
Health & Social Security 1.32 0 0 35 4.27
State Structure & Security 2.23 0 0 24 4.27
Infrastructure, Transport & 
Environment .62 0 0 33 2.98
Economy & Agriculture .32 0 0 45 3.16
Public Finances & Taxes .20 0 0 9 .89
Total Word Count 505.44 439 28 3094 361.33
Stop-words 192.18 166 9 1224 142.19
Note: Articles are the units of analysis, N=459
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